


This article was downloaded by: [Hebrew University]

On: 04 September 2012, At: 07:02

Publisher: Psychology Press

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Cognition & Emotion

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pcem20>

Evidence for utilitarian motives in emotion regulation

Maya Tamir ^{a b}, Brett Q. Ford ^c & Margaret Gilliam ^b

^a Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

^b Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA

^c Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA

Version of record first published: 24 Aug 2012

To cite this article: Maya Tamir, Brett Q. Ford & Margaret Gilliam (2012): Evidence for utilitarian motives in emotion regulation, *Cognition & Emotion*, DOI:10.1080/02699931.2012.715079

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2012.715079>



PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

BRIEF REPORT

Evidence for utilitarian motives in emotion regulation

Maya Tamir^{1,2}, Brett Q. Ford³, and Margaret Gilliam²

¹Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

²Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA

³Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA

This investigation demonstrates that emotion regulation can be driven by considerations of utility per se. We show that as participants prepared for a negotiation, those who were motivated to confront (vs. collaborate with) another person believed that anger would be more useful to them. However, only participants who were motivated to confront another and expected to receive a monetary reward for their performance (i.e., high utility), were motivated to increase their anger in preparation for the negotiation. Participants who were motivated to confront another but did not expect their performance to be rewarded (i.e., low utility), did not try to increase their anger, even though they expected anger to be useful in the negotiation. Such patterns demonstrate that people are motivated to experience even unpleasant emotions to maximise utility.

Keywords: Emotion regulation; Anger; Utility; Negotiations.

According to an instrumental approach to emotion regulation (e.g., Bonanno, 2001, Parrott, 1993, Tamir, 2009), people are motivated to increase or decrease either pleasant or unpleasant emotions in order to achieve their goals. This instrumental approach is predicated on the idea that people are often willing to forego immediate pleasure (e.g., Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989) to maximise utility (i.e., expected pleasure or satisfaction; Bentham, 1823/1968; Bernoulli, 1738/1954). In the context of emotion regulation, it is therefore plausible that people are motivated

to experience unpleasant emotions in the short term when doing so is outweighed by expected future benefits.

Several studies have tested the idea that people are motivated to increase even unpleasant emotions (i.e., forego immediate pleasure) when doing so might benefit goal pursuit. One study built on the theoretical assumption that excitement should be beneficial for the pursuit of approach goals, whereas fear should be beneficial for the pursuit of avoidance goals (e.g., Carver, 2001). This study demonstrated that people are more motivated to

Correspondence should be addressed to: Maya Tamir, Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem, 91905, Israel. E-mail: tamirm@mcss.huji.co.il

This work was supported by a National Science Foundation grant (SES 0920918) to MT.

increase excitement when pursuing approach goals, but more motivated to increase fear when pursuing avoidance goals (Tamir & Ford, 2009).

Other studies have built on empirical evidence for the beneficial effects of specific emotions in the pursuit of specific goals. In particular, the experience of anger has been found to promote successful confrontation and competition (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006), whereas the experience of happiness has been found to promote successful co-operation (e.g., Baron, 1990; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006). Building on such work, studies found that people are more motivated to increase their happiness when expecting to collaborate with another, but they are more motivated to increase their anger when expecting to confront another (e.g., Tamir & Ford, 2012; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). Consistent with an instrumental account of emotion regulation, preferences for anger were mediated by the belief that anger would benefit performance: Participants who were led to confront another were more likely to expect anger to be useful to them, which, in turn, led to greater preferences for anger (Tamir & Ford, 2012).

These findings show that people are motivated to experience emotions that promote concurrent goal pursuits. However, these findings do not provide direct evidence for a utilitarian mechanism—namely, they do not show that people want to experience emotions specifically in order to maximise expected benefits. This is because in these studies successful goal pursuit was always tied to high utility (i.e., participants always expected to be rewarded for successful performance, and the reward outweighed the momentary cost of mild unpleasant feelings).

Thus, prior studies have not conclusively shown that preferences for unpleasant emotions are shaped by considerations of utility per se (i.e., an attempt to maximise expected benefits). One alternative possibility, for instance, is that preferences for unpleasant emotions result from goal-related priming effects. In particular, it is possible that activating a goal automatically primes a

related emotion (i.e., makes an emotion construct more accessible), leading to increased motivation to experience it, regardless of the expected benefits of doing so. Just as priming the concept of “bread” may temporarily increase preferences for “butter”, priming the concept of “confrontation” may temporarily increase preferences for “anger”, regardless of its expected costs or benefits.

In contrast, we argue that when people pursue a particular goal (e.g., confrontation), they are sometimes motivated to increase even an unpleasant emotion that is goal-consistent (i.e., anger) not because it is more accessible, but because it yields higher utility (i.e., it is expected to yield higher future benefits). Just as a student should be motivated to study all night for an exam only when doing well on the exam is expected to lead to personal benefits, a person may be motivated to feel angry when preparing for a confrontation, but only when this momentary cost is expected to lead to a greater personal gain. This is because in both of these cases, the immediate displeasure is outweighed by the expected benefits (i.e., has high utility).

To test whether motives in emotion regulation can be driven by considerations of utility per se, it is necessary to directly manipulate expected utility. In the present investigation, therefore, we tested this hypothesis by separately manipulating the goals people pursued (i.e., confrontation vs. collaboration) and the subjective value of successful goal completion. Outside the laboratory, multiple factors contribute to subjective value. In the laboratory, monetary gains are often used as a common index of value (see Page, 1968). In the present context, therefore, to manipulate utility, we varied the monetary gains participants expected to receive upon successful goal completion (i.e., \$0 vs. \$10).

We predicted that participants in our study would be motivated to increase anger when pursuing a confrontation goal, but only when they expected successful goal pursuit to result in a monetary gain (i.e., high utility). We also predicted that regardless of the expected monetary gain, participants who pursue a confrontation goal would expect anger to be more useful for task

performance than those who pursue a collaboration goal. Finally, consistent with the prediction of an expectancy-value model of motivation (e.g., Tolman, 1955), we predicted that among participants in the high utility condition, beliefs about the usefulness of anger for task performance would mediate the link between goals and preferences for anger. Specifically, we expected participants who pursue a confrontation goal to view anger as more useful for task performance, and the more useful they expect anger to be, the more they would try to increase their anger in preparation for the task.

METHODS

Participants

Ninety-two students (67.4% female; $M_{age} = 19.29$ years) participated in return for course credit or \$10.

Procedure

Participants were told that the study was examining the extent to which memory skills predict performance in business interactions and that they would either recall an event from their past or listen to music before completing a negotiation task. They were told they would be able to indicate what type of memory they would prefer to recall and what type of music they would prefer to listen to. Similar to prior research, preferences for memories and music were designed to serve as behavioural indices of emotional preferences (e.g., Tamir & Ford, 2012; Tamir et al., 2008). Participants were told that during the negotiation, they would play the role of the president of a company and interact with another participant who would play the role of an employee whose job it was to implement the company's investment plan. The employee has been pushing for a new plan that may lead the company to miss an important investment opportunity.

After rating their concurrent emotional experiences, participants were randomly assigned to

either a confrontation or a collaboration goal condition. Participants in the confrontation condition were told their goal was to impose the company's investment plan on their employee so that it is implemented immediately. Participants in the collaboration condition were told their goal was to work together with the employee to develop the best investment plan.

Participants were also randomly assigned to either a low or a high utility condition. Participants in both conditions were told they would receive course credit or \$10 for basic participation, according to the preference they had indicated when signing up for the study.¹ However, participants in the high utility condition were told that if they are successful in the negotiation task, at the end of the study they would receive an extra \$10 in addition to the credit or cash they would receive for basic participation. Participants in the low utility condition were told their performance in the negotiation task would have no impact on the compensation they would receive at the end of the study. Participants then rated their preferences for music to listen to, followed by their preferences for past events to recall before the negotiation. They then rated how useful they expected various emotions to be in the upcoming task. Finally, participants were told that due to an unexpected technical difficulty they would not complete the negotiation task. They were debriefed and thanked.

Materials

Emotional preferences. Participants rated how much they wanted to listen to music clips and recall certain events from their past before the negotiation. Participants first listened to six 30-second music clips. The music included two anger-inducing clips (i.e., *Inquisition Symphony* and *Refuse/Resist* by Apocalyptica), two happiness-inducing clips (i.e., *Opening Theme* from the soundtrack of *The Triplets de Belleville* and *Dreamoz* by Jay Hannan), and two fear-inducing

¹ Participants choosing course credit or \$10 were randomly distributed across experimental conditions.

clips (i.e., *End Titles* from the soundtrack of *Jeepers Creepers 2* and *Leon Confronts the Horror*). To establish the validity of our measures, participants also rated the extent to which they wanted to recall past events in which they were angry, happy, or afraid, which either involved work or did not involve work (e.g., An event in which you were angry, involving work). Items were presented in a random order. Throughout the study, all ratings were made on a scale from 0 (*Not at all*) to 8 (*Extremely*).

Expected usefulness of emotions. Participants rated the extent to which they expected to be successful in the negotiation when feeling *angry* and *irritated* ($\alpha = .86$), *happy* and *cheerful* ($\alpha = .80$), and *nervous* and *worried* ($\alpha = .62$). These items were presented in a random order, interspersed with filler items (e.g., *tired*, *concentrated*).

Concurrent emotional experiences. Participants rated the extent to which they felt various emotions *right now*. To assess feelings of anger, we averaged across ratings of *irritated*, *aggressive*, *angry*, and *hostile* ($\alpha = .86$). To assess feelings of happiness, we averaged across ratings of *happy*, *cheerful*, and *excited* ($\alpha = .84$). To assess feelings of fear, we averaged across ratings of *afraid*, *worried*, and *distressed* ($\alpha = .77$).

RESULTS²

Emotional preferences

To test the influence of our manipulations on emotional preferences, we ran a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), in which Activity (music, memory) and Emotion (anger, happiness, fear) were within-subject factors and Goal

(confrontation vs. collaboration) and Utility (low vs. high) were between-subjects factors. As predicted, we found a significant Goal \times Emotion \times Utility interaction, $F(2, 90) = 3.33$, $p = .038$, $\eta^2 = .04$. To examine this interaction, we first created composite emotional preferences scores, by averaging across preferences for music and memories, separately for each emotion.³ We then ran a series of one-way ANOVAs predicting preferences for anger, happiness, and fear from Goal Condition, separately in the low and high utility conditions. As predicted and shown in Figure 1, participants who expected to benefit from successful performance (i.e., those in the high utility condition) had stronger preferences for anger in the confrontation than in the collaboration condition, $F(1, 46) = 5.26$, $p = .027$. Preferences for anger did not differ in the low utility condition, $F < 1$. Similarly, participants in the high utility condition had stronger preferences for happiness in the collaboration than the confrontation condition, $F(1, 46) = 7.54$, $p = .009$. Preferences for happiness did not differ significantly in the low utility condition, $F(1, 46) = 3.48$, $p = .07$. Participants did not differ in preferences for fear, $F_s < 1$.

This interaction qualified a significant Goal Condition \times Emotion interaction, $F(2, 90) = 8.54$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .09$, so that, on average, preferences for anger were higher in the confrontation versus collaboration conditions ($M_s = 2.33$ and 1.86, respectively), preferences for happiness were higher in the collaboration than the confrontation condition ($M_s = 5.26$ and 4.47, respectively), and preferences for fear were equivalent across conditions ($M_s = 1.97$ and 1.75, in the confrontation and collaboration conditions, respectively). There was also a main effect of

²None of the analyses were qualified by gender. Therefore, gender was omitted from the reported analyses.

³Correlations between preferences for music and preferences for memories with the same emotional tone were relatively low ($r_s = .33, .23$, $p_s < .05$, for anger and fear, respectively, and $r = .01$ for happiness), indicating that they tap independent constructs, but share some commonality. The predicted patterns were similar when each measure was examined separately. In the high utility condition, preferences for angry music were higher, $F(1, 46) = 4.53$, $p = .039$, and preferences for happy music were lower, $F(1, 46) = 4.25$, $p = .045$, in the confrontation than collaboration conditions. Similarly, preferences for angry memories were marginally higher, $F(1, 46) = 3.095$, $p = .085$, and preferences for happy memories were lower, $F(1, 46) = 4.21$, $p = .046$, in the confrontation than collaboration conditions. There were no differences in preferences for fearful music of fearful memories, $F_s < 1$. Preferences for emotional music or memories did not differ in the low utility conditions, $F_s < 2.52$, $p_s > .12$.




Figure 1. Preferences for emotion-inducing activities, as a function of goal condition, in the high utility (top) and low utility (bottom) conditions. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Note: * $p < .05$.

Emotion, $F(2, 90) = 215.36$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .71$, so that, on average, preferences were higher for happiness and lower for anger and fear ($M_s = 4.87$, 2.09, and 1.86, for happiness, anger, and fear, respectively). There was a main effect for Activity, $F(1, 91) = 5.20$, $p = .025$, $\eta^2 = .06$, such that participants expressed stronger preferences for music than memories ($M_s = 3.10$ and 2.78 respectively), and a significant Activity \times Emotion

interaction, $F(2, 90) = 26.87$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .23$, so that participants expressed relatively stronger preferences for angry and fearful music than memories. No other effects were significant, $F_s < 3.50$.

To ensure our findings were not driven by concurrent emotional experiences, we repeated the analysis above using centred ratings of concurrent anger, happiness, and fear as covariates. The Emotion \times Goal Condition \times Utility interaction

remained unchanged and was not qualified by concurrent emotions, $F(2, 90) = 3.31$, $p = .039$, $\eta^2 = .04$. The only significant effect was an Activity \times Happiness interaction, $F(1, 91) = 5.24$, $p = .025$, $\eta^2 = .06$. Specifically, there was no significant association between concurrent happiness and preferences for music, averaged across emotions ($r = -.05$). However, the happier participants were, the stronger were their preferences for recalling past events, averaged across emotions ($r = .24$, $p = .023$).

The expected usefulness of emotions

We predicted that the expected usefulness of emotions would vary as a function of the goal people pursued, but not as a function of the emotions' expected benefits. To test this prediction, we ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with Emotion (anger, happiness, fear) as a within-subject factor and Goal and Utility as two between-subjects factors. Supporting our prediction, we found a significant Emotion \times Goal Condition interaction, $F(2, 90) = 4.28$, $p = .015$, $\eta^2 = .05$, but the Emotion \times Goal Condition \times Utility interaction was not significant, $F < 1$. Follow-up tests of simple effects confirmed that participants in the confrontation conditions expected anger to be more useful than those in the collaboration conditions ($M_s = 2.05$ and 1.15 , respectively), $F(1, 91) = 8.50$, $p = .004$. The expected usefulness of happiness was somewhat higher in the collaboration than confrontation conditions ($M_s = 5.42$ and 4.94 , respectively), although this difference was not significant, $F(1, 91) = 2.16$, $p = .15$. There was no difference by condition in the expected usefulness of fear ($M_s = 2.07$ and 1.88 , respectively), $F < 1$.

Expected usefulness as a mediator of emotional preferences

We predicted that among participants in the high utility condition, the expected usefulness of anger would mediate the effects of goals on preferences for anger. When entered into linear regressions, Goal Condition ($-1 =$ collaboration,

$1 =$ confrontation) was a significant predictor of preferences for anger-inducing activities, $\beta = 0.32$, $t(46) = 2.29$, $p = .027$, and the expected usefulness of anger, $\beta = 0.38$, $t(46) = 2.71$, $p = .009$. When Goal Condition and the expected usefulness of anger were entered as simultaneous predictors, expected usefulness remained a significant predictor, $\beta = 0.57$, $t(46) = 4.51$, $p < .001$, whereas Goal Condition did not, $\beta = 0.11$, $t < 1$. The mediation was significant, Sobel's $z = 2.33$, $t < 1$, $p = .02$, (using bootstrapping methods, $CI_{95} = -.73, -.14$). Thus, the expected usefulness of anger fully mediated the link between goal conditions and preferences for anger in the high utility condition. Given that goals did not predict preferences for anger in the low utility condition, we did not test for mediation in that condition.

DISCUSSION

Why is it that in some contexts, people may be motivated to increase unpleasant emotions or decrease pleasant ones? One proposition is that people may be willing to experience unpleasant emotions in the short term, to maximise utility (e.g., Bonanno, 2001; Parrott, 1993). The current investigation tested whether considerations of utility per se (e.g., expected monetary gain) are necessary to motivate people to increase their anger.

In support of this idea, we demonstrated that participants had stronger preferences for anger-inducing activities as they prepared to confront another person in a negotiation, but only when doing so was expected to lead to personal benefits. Furthermore, the more useful participants expected anger to be in a negotiation, the more likely they were to select anger-inducing activities as they prepared for it, when they expected to be rewarded for good performance. Participants who did not expect to be rewarded for good performance did not show increased preferences for anger-inducing activities, even though they expected anger to improve their performance.

These findings demonstrate that preferences for anger can be driven by utilitarian considerations. Participants were motivated to endure the hedonic cost of increased short-term anger only when they expected it to result in a future payoff (i.e., a \$10 reward). However, when participants did not expect a personal reward, the concurrent hedonic cost of experiencing anger was no longer warranted, even though performance could benefit from it. Consistent with the assumptions of the instrumental approach to emotion regulation, these findings demonstrate that people are motivated to regulate their emotions in the short term in a manner that promotes long-term benefits (Tamir, 2009).

The findings help rule out the possibility that increased preferences for unpleasant emotions arise as a sole result of priming effects. Specifically, activating the construct of confrontation likely activated related constructs, including anger. To the extent that accessible information becomes more desirable (e.g., Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998), people may show stronger preferences for anger simply because it has increased in accessibility. If increased preferences for anger are merely the result of priming, participants should have shown increased preferences for anger in both the high and low utility conditions. If expected utility moderates the effect, it cannot be attributed to priming alone. This is what the present findings show.

The present findings also lend further support for the idea that people prefer to feel angry as they prepare for confrontations, because they expect it to enhance performance. Another possibility could be that people prefer to feel angry because it is socially appropriate in the context of confrontation. If adherence to social norms fully accounts for preferences for anger in confrontation, participants should have shown at least some increase in preferences for anger even in the low utility condition. This, however, was not the case. Therefore, at least in the present context, preferences in the high utility condition were driven by the expected implications of anger for performance rather than by the desire to experience seemingly appropriate emotions. This idea is

further supported by the fact that preferences for anger were mediated in the high utility condition by the expected usefulness of anger.

The current findings are important because they provide direct support for utilitarian motives in emotion regulation. Such motives have important theoretical and pragmatic implications (see Tamir, 2009). For instance, if people are motivated to experience emotions they expect would benefit them, emotional preferences should vary as a function of people's expectations regarding the potential benefits of certain emotions in certain contexts (see Tamir, Salerno, Rhodes, & Schreier, 2012). Such expectations, in turn, could depend on situational characteristics, cultural differences, or personality (e.g., Cameron & Payne, 2011; Tsai, 2007; Wood, Heimpel, Manwell, & Whitting, 2009).

There are, however, some limitations to the present research. First, the current study examined preferences for anger in confrontation and collaboration. Future studies could test whether the present findings extend to other unpleasant emotions, during the pursuit of other related goals. Second, the present study examined motives in emotion regulation rather than emotion regulation *per se*. Participants indicated preferences for emotion-inducing activities, but did not engage in these activities and rate their subsequent emotions. Prior studies using similar indices of motives in emotion regulation have found that when participants engage in their selected activities, their emotional experience changes in a consistent manner. For instance, participants who select more anger-inducing activities experience more intense anger after engaging in the activities they selected (Tamir & Ford, 2012; Tamir et al., 2012). Nonetheless, in the future, it would be useful to show that considerations of utility can determine what people want to feel, and, in doing so, help shape subsequent emotional experiences.

Finally, we manipulated utility as a bipolar construct (i.e., high utility vs. none). In the future, it would be interesting to compare the effects of different levels of future payoffs. Such studies could help identify the minimal level of future

payoff that would motivate people to increase anger or other negative emotions (i.e., mean-level or individual thresholds). In the future, it would also be interesting to use indices of value other than money (e.g., a sense of competence or relatedness). By pointing to the role of utilitarian considerations in emotion regulation, this investigation points to the possible relevance of utility theories, broadly construed, to the understanding of emotion regulation.

Manuscript received 30 March 2012

Revised manuscript received 11 July 2012

Manuscript accepted 18 July 2012

First published online 24 August 2012

REFERENCES

- Baron, R. A. (1990). Environmentally induced positive affect: Its impact on self-efficacy, task performance, negotiation, and conflict. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 20*, 368–384.
- Bentham, J. (1968). An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. In A. L. Page (Ed.), *Utility theory: A book of readings* (pp. 3–29). New York, NY: Wiley. (Original work published in 1823)
- Bernoulli, D. (1954). Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk. *Econometrica, 22*, 23–36. Translated by Louise Sommer from “Specimen Theoriae Noveae de Mensura Sortis”, *Commentarii Academiae Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae, Tomus V*. (Original work published in 1738)
- Bonanno, G. A. (2001). Emotion self-regulation. In T. J. Mayne & G. A. Bonanno (Eds.), *Emotions: Current issues and future directions* (pp. 251–285). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Cameron, C. D., & Payne, B. K. (2011). Escaping affect: How motivated emotion regulation creates insensitivity to mass suffering. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100*, 1–15.
- Carnevale, P., & Isen, A. (1986). The influence of positive affect and visual access on the discovery of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 37*, 1–13.
- Carver, C. (2001). Affect and the functional bases of behavior: On the dimensional structure of affective experience. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5*, 345–356.
- Forgas, J. (1998). On feeling good and getting your way: Mood effects on negotiator cognition and bargaining strategies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 565–577.
- Kopelman, S., Rosette, A., & Thompson, L. (2006). The three faces of Eve: Strategic displays of positive, negative, and neutral emotions in negotiations. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99*, 81–101.
- Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. L. (1989). Delay of gratification in children. *Science, 244*, 933–938.
- Page, A. N. (1968). *Utility theory: A book of readings*. New York, NY: Wiley.
- Parrott, W. G. (1993). Beyond hedonism: Motives for inhibiting good moods and for maintaining bad moods. In D. M. Wegner & J. W. Pennebaker (Eds.), *Handbook of mental control* (pp. 278–305). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Reber, R., Winkielman, P., & Schwarz, N. (1998). Effects of perceptual fluency on affective judgments. *Psychological Science, 9*, 45–48.
- Tamir, M. (2009). What do people want to feel and why? Pleasure and utility in emotion regulation. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18*, 101–105.
- Tamir, M., & Ford, B. Q. (2009). Choosing to be afraid: Preferences for fear as a function of goal pursuit. *Emotion, 9*, 488–497.
- Tamir, M., & Ford, B. Q. (2012). When feeling bad is expected to be good: Emotion regulation and outcome expectancies in social conflicts. *Emotion, 12*, 807–816.
- Tamir, M., Mitchell, C., & Gross, J. J. (2008). Hedonic and instrumental motives in anger regulation. *Psychological Science, 19*, 324–328.
- Tamir, M., Salerno, J., Rhodes, E., & Schreier, J. (2012). *An expectancy-value model of emotion regulation: How the expected usefulness of emotions shapes emotion regulation, experience, and performance*. Manuscript under review.
- Tolman, E. C. (1955). Principles of performance. *Psychological Review, 62*, 315–326.
- Tsai, J. (2007). Ideal affect: Cultural causes and behavioral consequences. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2*, 242–259.
- Van Kleef, G., De Dreu, C., & Manstead, A. (2004). The interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations: A motivated information processing approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87*, 510–528.

- Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., Pietroni, D., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2006). Power and emotion in negotiation: Power moderates the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness on concession making. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 36*, 557–581.
- Wood, J., Heimpel, S., Manwell, L., & Whittington, E. (2009). This mood is familiar and I don't deserve to feel better anyway: Mechanisms underlying self-esteem differences in motivation to repair sad moods. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96*, 363–380.